International markets for the majority of subsidies to promote exports or tariffs and agricultural commodities are extremely com-quotas to restrict trade; they can curtail plex. They include public and private traders production by the use of acreage controls along with influences from domestic and in-or increase it by price supports; they can ternational government policies. In recent also influence price by direct involvement years, the United States has experienced a in the price negotiations between exporters decline in the market share in two of its and importers (that is, by state trading)" major agricultural exports-rice and wheat. (Schmitz et al., p. 23) . However, in addition, For example, at one time the United States the private trade is a key player along with had roughly 45 percent of the world wheat government marketing boards. To illustrate market; but, by the end of 1985, its share a contrast, the Canadian Wheat Board is a had dropped below 40 percent. Also, in terms producer marketing board and the sole seller of rice, the United States market share has of Canadian wheat for the export market; its dropped from 25 percent to below 20 per-sales to the Soviet Union are examples of cent.
state trading. In the United States, a few major The question arises as to whether the loss private grain companies export the largest in the market share has anything to do with portion of United States grain. A sale by one marketing institutions or whether this market of these private firms to the Soviet Union share decline has more to do with govern-would be viewed as a private-to-government ment policy and agricultural productivity. I sale. In the United States, while cooperatives will compare and contrast the United States play a major role at the farm-collection level, competitive position in both import and ex-they influence less than 20 percent of wheat port markets. I first compare the wheat and exports. Once wheat leaves the country elrice markets where clearly southern agricul-evator, the majority of the wheat becomes ture has a major stake. A major difference in the product of multinational grain compathese markets is that a lively futures market nies exists for wheat, while such is absent in the The degree to which governments and rice trade. An analysis of the cotton market boards are involed in international pricing is also presented. Then, certain imported of grains has been changing. Canada and Auscommodities which are of crucial importance tralia have been state traders since the into southern agriculture are discussed. I make trae a a state trader brief comments on sugar and the importation terwar period; Argentina was a state trader of fresh winter vegetables. Sugar is clearly a until the mid-1970s but now relies on the concern for Texas and Louisiana, while fresh private trade; and the United States, the Euwinter vegetables are of major concern to ropean Community (EC), and Thailand rly Florida.
on private traders. Thus, on the export side, the growing dominance of the United States means that the volume of grain trade origiWheat nating in state-trading nations has declined. On the import side, the opposite is occurring. Government policies influence the wheat Traditional markets in Western Europe, which trade in many ways. "They can use export relied on private traders. have declined, while the importance of the centrally planned econMany people have questioned why farm omies to the developing countries has in-cooperatives have not played a more signifcreased. McCalla and Schmitz (1979a) icant role in the exporting of United States estimated that the proportion of wheat that grain and why they turn much of their busiinvolves only private traders is small and ness over to the private sector. The following declining, involving only 5 percent of the reasons are given: (1) lack of access to cotrade during [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] . The reciprocal, of operative export facilities, (2) less risk in course, is that 95 percent of the world trade indirect sales, (3) better price, (4) econin wheat involves a state trader on at least omies of size, (5) lack of expertise, (6) unone side of the transaction. Second, state willingness to coordinate, and (7) fear of the trader-to-state trader transactions account for unknown. The main differences between coabout one-third of the trade and this per-operatives making direct export sales and the centage seems to be fairly stable through private trade are the cooperatives lack of: time.
(1) a market intelligence system, (2) divIn spite of increased involvement in the ersification, (3) multiple grain sources, (4) pricing of wheat by governments and mar-flexibility, (5) overseas facilities and sales keting boards, the private grain trade still offices, and (6) secrecy of operations. For plays a major role in the marketing of both example, lack of diversification of cooperawheat and feed grains, even for countries tives means that they cannot spread the risks where state agencies dominate. The private inherent in the exporting business. grain firms, which are multinational in scope, Studies have been made in the international carry out several functions crucial to the wheat market to determine the extent of marmarketing of grain. For example, in Canada ket power by exporters and importers. the private trade is involved since it carries McCalla has argued that the market is oliout shipping and other activities related to gopolistic and that Canada is a price leader. getting the grain from Canada to importers. Later, Alaouze et al. postulated a triopoly As McCalla and Schmitz (1979b) point out, model of the world wheat market with Canthe private grain traders act as agents to wheat ada as a revenue-maximizing price leader. boards in both Canada and Australia. In some However, Carter and Schmitz 'argue that, if cases, they merely carry out the marketing anyone has market power, it is the importer. transactions after the board has negotiated a They contend that importers follow an opprice with an importer. In other cases, they timal tariff strategy in that they impose tariffs will make outright purchases from the board which, in essence, make importers better off and resell this grain to importers. than under free trade. They demonstrate this Generally, state traders never become in-for the period prior to 1979 and clearly show volved directly in the logistical terms of the the optimal tariff case for countries, such as grain-handling system. The Canadian Wheat Japan, and in the European Community. If Board, for example, sells principally on an nations follow an optimal import strategy f.o.b. basis leaving the importer to deal with through optimal tariffs, they are in essence, the risks involving shipping, freight, and for-setting prices in the world market by behaveign exchange. Similarly, state trading im-ing as monopsony buyers in international porters typically buy on cost plus insurance trade. If this theory is correct, exporters must and freight basis. This means that, in con-seriously consider the extent to which they tractual arrangements involving a state trad-have been losing out on world trade because ing exporter and a state trading importer, a of the lack of market power. middleman (usually a multinational grain A striking difference between multinational firm) is almost always involved in at least grain firms and producer marketing boards the logistics of the trade. Second, a private in a given country is that a given multinatrader buying grain from a state trading ex-tional grain company, unlike a marketing porter, without a prior sales contract, has a board, buys grain from many countries and large range of contractual variables on which sells grain to many countries. This gives the to negotiate with importers, private or state. multinational grain companies an advantage Thus, in these cases, considerable scope for over marketing boards in the marketing of price variation exists. In addition, the private grain since they have access to many sources sector is also heavily involved in carrying out of supply to meet export commitments. This the merchandising activity for United States raises the question of producer welfare at government sales under P.L. 480.
any point in time since, when the large com-panies shop around for the best deal for It is generally held that the reason the United themselves, their actions do not necessarily States market share is falling is due to a always benefit the producers in a country in government loan rate which is set too high. which the parent company is located. Clearly, the 1985 Farm Bill has lowered the There is an active futures market in wheat loan rate; therefore, if this has been the major and it is used extensively by private grain factor determining market share in the world companies. It is used to a lesser extent by grain trade, the market share in the next year state traders on the importing side and is or two should increase substantially. rarely used directly by marketing boards in exporting countries although, recently, Aus-RICE tralia increased its involvement in United States wheat futures. However, Canada still and The export sdoubled b etwee uses the futures market indirectly. For ex-mart is d The export side of the rice ample, the transactions it carries out with market is dominated byafew Asiancountries the private trade are generally hedged on and the United States while the import side United States futures markets.
is more dispersed geographically. The United
Information is gathered from all sources States and Thailand are the two largest rice and is revealed in futures market prices which exporters, accounting for roughly 50 percent are available to exporters, importers, pro-of the trade since 1980. Because of strong ducers, and the like. In a sense, one could tastes and preferences, there is limited subargue that the futures market is the central stitution between the various types of rice. pricing point in the international grain marOn an international basis, price data are ket. In a recent paper, Caves argued that the not available by type of rice. The most comexistence of the active futures market assures monly used world price is the Thailand exthat the private grain trade is highly com-portpriceformilledrice, 100percentsecond petitive. Whether or not this is the case is grade (Grade B, f.o.b. mill, Bangkok). Acnot debated here. What is more open to ques-cording to Slayton, the Bangkok f.o.b. price tion is the extent to which futures markets is not truly representative of the actual tradgive such trading nations as the Soviet Union, ing price. It is sometimes as much as 10 an advantage over exporters. Clearly, coun-percent above the transaction price. Governtries such as China and the Soviet Union have ment involvement in the international rice excellent information about the grain mar-trade has been extensive. In 1983, governkets through futures markets activities since ments were active in 60 percent of total prices on these markets are quoted daily. imports and 46 percent of total exports (SlayHowever, major exporters, such as the United ton). Only in the United States, Australia, States, do not have a great deal of information Italy, Argentina, Uruguay, and Spain are exon the Soviet Union other than through sat-ports left to the private trade. Governmentellites, cooperative agreements, etc. Thus, to-government contracts are used extensively one could argue that the information gained as trade instruments. More than 43 percent through futures markets is asymmetric.
of rice exports by Thailand, Pakistan, and In the wheat trade, one might wonder the Burma in 1983 were via these arrangements. extent to which the private trade deals mostly
The rice market can be characterized as with private importers and the extent to which thin, volatile, and risky. The lack of widely state traders deal with state traders. In the quoted actual trading price data adds to the Canadian case, more and more of their ex-trading risk. There is no common price quoted ports are going to Communist countries. by type or quality of rice in the international Therefore, in this case, state traders are in-market nor is there a commonly used grade creasing their involvement with other state standard. There is no world-recognized centraders. However, it may well be that private tral futures market for rice. Thus, without traders find those types of markets where the the existence of any effective futures market, private trade on the importing side is very the trading risk is increased since traders are active, exposed to large profits or losses when there The United States has been losing its market is no hedging (Stucker) . In addition, the rice share in the world wheat market during the market is one where transaction costs are 1980s. People have contended that this is frequently high because of the need to search essentially due to United States farm policy for supply sources (Siamwalla and Haykin) . and has nothing to do with grain marketing. This search may entail costs to private traders-for example, brokerage fees or time-political arrangements are also clearly corlost cost to governments. In spite of the sig-related with the degree of state trading among nificance of state trading, the international nations. rice markets support a number of brokerage How efficient is the world rice market? houses in the United States, Singapore, Hong There is no easy answer. Clearly, information Kong, and Europe. Brokerage fees of 5 to 10 is a key to efficient marketing (Sarris and percent are not uncommon. These rates are Schmitz,). Because of economies of scale in significantly higher for rice than for wheat information gathering and the absence of rice presumably because of higher search costs futures markets, it is hypothesized that wide (Rastegari-Henneberry).
and volatile marketing margins exist for large The United States world market shares rice trading firms. ative. It markets roughly one-half of the cotton In the United States, rice exports under grown in Arizona and California. Some of the government programs (P.L. 480) have played major private players in the market also are a significant role in promoting United States those in the grain trade. These include Bunge, rice exports (Stucker), but exports under P.L. Cargill, and Continental Grain-Cargill mar-480, as a percentage of total United States kets through a subsidiary called Ralli and exports, declined in 1976 and 1982 from Continental markets through Conticotton in over 44 percent to less than 12 percent. Fresno, California. The industry consists of Although this market share is recovering many growers. Cotton from growers is hansomewhat, its role has not been as signifi-died by shippers, ginners, brokers, commiscantly as it was during the late 1970s. Thus, sioned buyers, CCC loans, and cooperatives government involvement has significantly af-that, in turn, then deal with foreign mills. fected the United States rice market share. Cotton not placed under loan at harvest is Also, political factors have influenced the usually sold to one of the following types of market share where governments on a state-firms: to-state trading basis are more reluctant to (1) merchant shippers who perform all trade with certain countries than with others.
functions involved in moving cotton There has been a major shift in importers' from the producer to the foreign mill. sources of supply, especially in developing (2) cooperative marketing associations countries which constitute about 70 to 75 which act as shippers and represent percent of world rice imports. African and producer members of the association Middle Eastern countries have increased their and distribute any profits to producimport share as a percentage of world trade, ers. while Asian countries (South Korea and In-(3) brokers or commissioned buyers who donesia, in particular) have decreased theirs purchase cotton in country markets since the 1970s. In the Middle Eastern marfrom producers or ginners and sell it kets, United States exports to Iran and Syria to domestic mills on behalf of merhave also decreased as Thailand exports inchant shippers or large producers, and creased. These markets, clearly affected by (4) gin buyers who are usually gin owners not only economic but also political forces, supplementing their income by acting have played.a role in the decline of the United as a merchant shipper in that they take States market share. Political influence and title to the cotton.
There is an active futures market in cotton grew substantially in the 1970s but lost in which many foreign buyers, e.g., Japan, ground in the 1984-85 period. Thus, the hedge. In addition, the trade carries out hedg-United States is losing its market share in ing activities on the cotton futures exchange. cotton just as it has its wheat and other comIn the total market, merchant shippers and modities described in this paper. the cooperative marketing associations hanThere are many United States and interdle the greatest part of each year's cotton national cotton organizations which facilitate crop both for domestic use and export. They the trade. These include the National Cotton handle approximately three-fourths of all Council; the Cotton Council International; United States cotton marketings. Most United The American Cotton Marketing CooperaStates cotton exporters are members of either tives; Cotton, Inc.; the International Institute the American Cotton Shippers Association or for Cotton; and the Committee for Internathe American Cotton Marketing Cooperatives. tional Cooperation Between Cotton AssociThere are also active spot cotton markets ations. located in such areas as Montgomery, AlaIn terms of United States export programs, bama; Phoenix, Arizona; Augusta, Georgia; P.L. 480 plays a major role. Under Title 1, and Fresno, California.
the United States is authorized to sell cotton, With futures and hedging by importers, it cotton yarn, and unfinished fabric manufacis hypothesized that the size of stockholding tured entirely from United States cotton on is affected as is its distribution. The exporter long-term credits. Because cotton is sold to generally ends up holding the stocks. The many of the Communist countries around the importer needs to hold only minimal stocks world, much of the trade involves state tradsince such firms can avoid risks by hedging ing at least on one side of the market transon United States futures markets.
action. This follows since countries, such as Interestingly, the export cotton market is China, essentially have government buyers such that not all sellers sell in all markets. who are in charge of buying the commodity Not every cotton exporter tries to sell in all and carrying out the import activities. Howexport markets or offers all of the varieties ever, countries in Western Europe rely heavproduced in the United States. It is difficult ily on the private trade to carry out and expensive to serve efficiently all of the transactions. It is hypothesized that state trad-50 or more foreign countries that buy United ing agencies do a larger volume of business States cotton. Some exporters, therefore, con-with United States cotton cooperatives than centrate on certain foreign countries and oth-do private buying agencies in importing ers specialize in particular specialized market countries. As with wheat and rice, we hyareas. Thus, one can think of marketing zones pothesize that private companies have a tendwithin the international cotton market where ency to do business with other private certain traders operate in specific zones and companies and that state traders have a tenddo not cross over into the several other mar-ency to do business with other state trading keting zones that exist.
agencies. Therefore, one could test whether Cotton is similar to wheat in that an ex-or not this type of transaction, itself, leads porter can either be a buying or selling agency to certain buying patterns and marketing rings and can make a commission strictly on sales. in the international cotton market. For example, a cooperative could make a sale to a major importer and have the private trade essentially carry out the marketing activities WINTER VEGETABLES after the cotton leaves the farm gate. This is There is a significant trade of fresh winter sometimes referred to as the merchandising vegetables between the United States and part of the trade. Also, at times, a cooperative Mexico. The major southern producer parsells cotton directly to the private trade where ticipant on the United States side is Florida. the private trade then negotiates, in addition Historically, Florida producers, through the to merchandising, the final price for the cot-courts, have brought dumping charges against ton.
Mexico in the fresh winter vegetable trade. In recent years, the 10 largest markets for The United States Departments of Commerce United States cotton have been Canada, China, and the Treasury, in their initial investigaHong Kong, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, tions, ruled that dumping as perceived under the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. The United States law was not occurring (the United States' market share in world cotton 1978 Dumping Investigation). In the appeal, Florida argued that dumping was occurring in which, perhaps, distortions are greater in that Mexican producers were selling veg-than in any other commodity. At the end of etables below the cost of production. In the 1985, United States producer prices were final analysis, the United States government roughly three-and-one-half times greater than ruled that dumping was not occurring; there-world market sugar prices. This is, in large fore, essentially, fresh winter vegetables are part, because sugar producers in the United allowed to move into the United States market States are highly protected through quotas. duty free (Schmitz et al.) . This example pro-In addition, a larger percentage of the sugar vides an interesting case where marketing trade involves state-to-state traders and, in institutions may well have played and con-certain cases, trade is blocked for political tinue to play a major role.
reasons. Cuba, for example, is considered to At Nogales, many brokers exist who, in be one of the world's most efficient sugar essence, represent or buy from vegetable producers; yet, it cannot export sugar to the growers and sell to United States and Cana-United States market (Bates and Schmitz) . In dian buyers. The structure of this wholesale addition, although Cuba sells sugar to certain market at Nogales is somewhat unknown in countries at the free-market or residual world that there are many intermediaries that rep-price, it sells sugar to its ally, the Soviet resent different interests. However, those bro-Union, at much higher prices than the Soviet kers who do not represent Mexican growers Union could buy sugar elsewhere. In part, certainly have it in their interest to have the Soviet Union is financing activities in liberalized trade, large volumes of shipments, Cuba through its purchases of sugar at prices and price instability. Thus, to maximize prof-well above what Cuba could obtain for its its for certain wholesalers, one would not sugar in other destinations. argue for United States tariffs on Mexican
There is an international sugar futures marvegetables, nor would wholesalers (except ket from which is derived some notion of for those who represent Mexican interests) free-market or residual prices. Clearly, the want to pursue cooperative United States-United States users, such as Coca Cola, Pepsi Mexican growers' strategies. Such coopera-Cola, and Mars chocolate, cannot buy sugar tive strategies include voluntary quotas and at these prices since the United States quota marketing orders where economic rents to provision requires that the price of imported both Florida and Mexican producers can be sugar roughly correspond to the United States maximized through either one of these means producer price after certain adjustments are (Bredahl et al.) . Free trade is, in essence, a made for transportation, etc. Therefore, the competitive strategy where the rents of Flor-role of sugar futures trading is not clear. ida producers are lower than they would be While it does give some indication of either had a cooperative strategy been pursued. To the surplus or deficit situation of sugar in pursue a cooperative strategy entails not only residual markets, it clearly does not do a cooperation among Florida producers and great deal (especially in a surplus market) Mexican producers but, in addition, inter-to facilitate the import/export trade. For exmediaries who carry out the trade. It is hy-ample, when the world price is at least three pothesized that the type of intermediaries times below the United States price, it is involved in international trade between Mex-doubtful whether or not Coca Cola would ico and the United States greatly influences hedge on world sugar futures markets unless the type of outcome that is finally realized it expected free-market prices to exceed in international trade arrangements.
United States internal prices (at times in hisAs with rice, there are no futures markets tory, this has been the case). However, fuin fresh vegetables such as lettuce, cucum-tures, especially the domestic futures, are bers, etc. As a result, these are high-risk crops used by companies to carry out the merwith imperfect markets. Growers generally chandising part of the trade. cannot hedge their crop at the time it is Sugar represents a case where producers planted.
are highly protected, international trade is highly distorted, and the efficient functioning SUGAR of a sugar market can be questioned. After The efficient functioning of the world and state trading in sugar is carried out plus exUnited States markets has been a controversial port dumping created by European Comsubject area for many years (Leu et al.) . This munity subsidies, one is essentially left with is partly because it is an international market a residual or free market in sugar where the volume has to be less than one-third of in-ketplace than do the inefficiencies created ternational trade in sugar (Hoff and Law-by marketing institutions. That is, even if rence). markets are inefficient, the impact is probably Within the United States, there are also key far less than the impact that governments players who are influential in dictating the create. For example, in the United States one outcome of the United States farm programs could hypothesize that multinational grain for sugar and, hence, its marketing. In the companies prefer an open high volume, highly 1985 Farm Bill, the sugar policy was essen-unstable market since they are in the business tially unchanged from what it had been his-of buying and selling commodities; the return torically. Quotas are still the driving policy to information is the highest for those types instrument for United States sugar producers, of markets. It would appear that they would and sugar prices under the 1985 Farm Bill support a policy of lowering the loan rate have virtually remained unchanged for United (which was the case in the 1985 Farm Bill), States producers. United States sugar users thus increasing the volume of trade. An inwant a reduction of sugar prices since sugar crease in the loan rate would do the opposite. represents an input to their production procIt is interesting to read the numerous studess. However, certain key players, including ies which have been done on analyzing the many sugar beet refineries, oppose the im-1985 Farm Bill. Most of the attention was portation of sugar from abroad. Cooperatives given to the impact of the United States govthat are involved in both producing and pro-ernment policies on farmers' income and the cessing sugar beets support protection from world grain trade. Essentially, no mention imports since they want high prices for sugar was made about the role of marketing instifor their producers. However, a refinery, tutions in international trade and how they which is involved strictly in the refining proc-support or do not support aspects of the 1985 ess, clearly wants a large volume of raw sugar Farm Bill. This is an area which is wide open regardless of its source; therefore, these types to research and part of it would have to be of refineries generally support free trade in examined within the context of rent seeking sugar since, under this regime, they would in international trade where major players have much more processing than currently are discussed, including producers, governis the case under quota protection. That is, ment marketing boards, and multinational they would prefer to process both domesti-grain companies. cally produced sugar and the large volume
In addition, our argument is that marketing imported from abroad. In essence, the sugar boards or state traders easily facilitate the beet producers and their integration through carrying out of monopsony power on the part the refining process have a different objective of buyers. For example, the optimal tariff in international trade and policy formulation argument presented earlier is strengthened than has a sugar refinery which does not own when a government or a group of governany production facilities at the farm level ments can impose tariffs and have state traders but, rather, merely refines sugarcane or sugar import the commodity. Also, the question beets regardless of their source.
has to be explored as to the extent to which importers can exert market power because CONCLUSIONS of asymmetric information. The hypothesis This study has described international com-was raised, for example, that the Soviet Union modity markets important to southern agri-probably has more information about markets culture. Some of the markets contain futures from which they buy than vice versa. markets as a price formation mechanism while
In conclusion, cooperation is needed among others do not. Perhaps, those markets that major grain exporters-not increased comdo not contain futures are more inefficient petition. Many of the current marketing inthan those in which futures markets exist.
stitutions are efficient in terms of textbook It is hypothesized that government policy definitions. However, in being efficient, they instruments, such as the United States target create competition among major exporters. price and loan rates, and the price-support To overcome some of the trade barriers, perpolicy of the European Community create haps less competition and more cooperation greater distortions in the international mar-would be desirable.
